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We study learning eﬀectiveness as a function of memory size.
We quantify the maximal level that a bounded memory machine
(or agent) can match (or reproduce) a long string of inputs as a func-
tion of the input length k and the memory size n. The input string
is an element of Ik and the output string is an element of Jk and the
loss of the agent when matching an input coordinate i ∈ I with an
output coordinate j ∈ J is g(i,j).
This level is expressed by a function v(p,θ) of two variables: a
probability p on I and a nonnegative θ ≥ 0. The function v(p,θ)
is deﬁned as a function of the triple G = hI,J,gi. It equals the
minimum of EQg(i,j), where the minimization is over all distributions
Q on action pairs with marginal p on I, denoted QI, and the mutual
information IQ(i;j) = H(QI) + H(QJ) − H(Q) ≤ θ, where H is the
entropy function.
If i1,...,ik are iid I-valued random variables with distribution p,




t=1 g(it,jt) ≥ v(p,
log|T|
k ).
Moreover, for every ﬁnite set T of functions τ from the ﬁnite strings







k ). It follows that if σ is the mixed strategy of player 1 in the
inﬁnite repetition of the stage game G that plays a k-periodic sequence
i1,i2,..., where i1,...,ik are iid random variables with distribution p,
then for every strategy τ of player 2 that is deﬁned by an automaton
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t=1 g(iL+t,jL+t) ≥ v(p,
logn
k ) for every
L. This inequality holds also for any strategy τ of player 2 that is
deﬁned by the most general machine with n states of memory (for
example, the machine can have, in addition to its n memory states,
access to a clock and to a randomization device).
On the other hand, for every k and n there is a function f : Ik →
T ⊂ Jk with |T| ≤ n such that 1
k
Pk
t=1 g(it,jt) ≤ v(p,
logn
k ) + o(1)
(as k → ∞), where p is the empirical distribution of i1,...,ik and
(j1,...,jk) = f(i1,...,ik). In addition, we prove that there is a
deterministic automaton with n states and input alphabet I that
when faced with a periodic sequence i1,i2,... of I-inputs with period







k ) + o(1) as k → ∞, where p(σ) is the empirical distribu-
tion of the sequence i1,i2,....
It follows that the value of the two-person zero-sum repeated game
G[k,n] (with stage game G = hI,J,gi), where player 1’s possible
strategies are those deﬁned by oblivious automata of size k and player
2’s possible strategies are those deﬁned by automata of size n, con-
verges, as k goes to inﬁnity and
logn
k goes to θ ≥ 0, to the limit
v(θ), where v(θ) is the max of v(p,θ) where the max is over all mixed
stage actions p of player 1. Moreover, player 2 has a pure strategy
in G[k,n] that is approximately optimal. The result remains intact ?
when player 2’s possible strategies are those deﬁned by automata with
time-dependent mixed actions and mixed transitions.
The minimal duration of learning is derived from the analysis of




k goes to θ then the values of GL[k,n] converge to
v(θ).
21 Introduction
Some hedge funds owe their success to recognizing economic patterns that
their competitors failed to notice. Their discovery of such trading strategies
contradicts the common economic/ﬁnance theory wisdom that agents are
fully rational with unlimited computational and memory capacities. After
all, if one hedge fund is capable of ﬁnding such proﬁtable patterns, why
should others not be able to trade on the same patterns?
Such contradictions dissipate if one takes into account the limited ratio-
nality of agents.
The present paper derives quantitative results about the level at which a
limited rational agent can utilize repeated patterns of streaming data.
We consider a decision maker that interacts with a stochastic process (it)
with values it in the ﬁnite set I. At stage t ≥ 1 the decision maker outputs
an action jt in the ﬁnite set J, and thereafter observes the realization it, and
the cost at stage t to the decision maker is g(it,jt) where g : I × J → R.
If the t-coordinate it of the process is a known deterministic function of the
past (is)1≤s<t, then a decision maker with unbounded memory and unlimited
computational ability can compute it as a function of the past (is)1≤s<t and
guarantee at stage t the minimal feasible cost minj g(it,j). In particular, if for
t > k the it coordinate of the process is a function of i1,...,ik, a “supersmart”
agent can output the jt that minimizes the cost g(it,jt). However, if the
decision maker has a bounded memory, such a perfect optimization may
prove impossible.
The results characterize a threshold (continuous) function v of two vari-
ables: a distribution p on I and the positive number
logn
k such that 1) the
agent has a simple strategy that uses n states of memory such that for every
k-periodic sequence the average per-stage cost is v(p,
logn
k )+o(1) (as k → ∞)
where p is the empirical distribution of (it); and 2) if (it) is a k-periodic se-
quence with i1,...,ik iid with distribution p, then for every strategy with n
states of memory the expected average per-stage cost is at least v(p,
logn
k ).
The strategy in 1) is the simplest strategy with n states of memory: a de-
terministic (stationary) automaton with n states. Moreover, the automaton’s
program is a natural simple program and ﬁnding it requires little sophisti-
cation: a natural random choice leads with high probability to the desired
approximate optimal automaton. On the other hand, the inequality in 2)
holds for the most general strategy with n states of memory: a probabilistic
time-dependent automaton with n states. Therefore the results are robust
3with respect to the choice of modeling strategies with n states of memory.
An important ingredient of the model is that when the agent outputs
jt he is in one of n states of memory and this state can be a function of
i1,...,it−1. The state of memory then is the only record of the history
i1,...,it−1. At stage t an additional input it is observed. Therefore the state
of memory recording the history i1,...,it, mt+1 = m(i1,...,it) is a function
of mt = m(i1,...,it−1) and it. The classical model of an automaton requires
this function to be deterministic and stationary (independent of t). The most
general model of an n-state memory will allow the function mapping mt and
it to mt+1 to depend on time and a randomization device.
The periodicity of the sequence is essential for the statement of the formal
result but is not conceptually important. An alternative interpretation (or
statement) of the result is that the agent examines a long stream of data




The agent with n states of memory is modeled here as an automaton with n
states. The states of the automaton are partitioned into transition states and
terminal states. As long as the automaton is in a transition state it continues
to examine the sequence. Once reaching a terminal state it no longer has
access to the sequence and starts to output j1,...,jk (as a function of the
terminal state).
We turn now to the statement and the discussion of the results from
a game-theoretic perspective. Let G = hI,J,gi be a two-person zero-sum
game; I and J are the ﬁnite action sets of players 1 and 2 respectively, and
g : I × J → R is the payoﬀ function to player 1. The repeated game, where
player 1’s, respectively player 2’s, possible strategies are those deﬁned by
automata of size k, respectively size n, and the payoﬀ is the average per-
stage payoﬀ, is denoted G(k,n). Ben-Porath (1986, 1993) proves that the





n goes to 0 (namely, the size of the larger automata is
subexponential of the size of the smaller automata).
It follows that in order to have an asymptotic nonvanishing advantage
in the repeated game with ﬁnite-state automata an exponentially larger au-
tomata size is needed. [12] (respectively, [18]) proves that if liminfk→∞
lognk
k
is > min{log|I|,log|J|} (respectively, ≥ min{log|I|,log|J|}), then the value
of G(k,nk) converges, as k goes to inﬁnity, to the maxmin of the stage game,
where player 1 maximizes over his pure stage actions i ∈ I and player 2 min-
imizes over his pure stage actions j ∈ J. The asymptotic behavior of the val-
ues of G(k,nk) as nk/k → θ > 0 is unknown for 0 < θ < min{log|I|,log|J|}.
4The approximate optimal strategies used in [1] are mixtures of oblivious
strategies (namely, strategies that are nonreactive to the actions of the other
player) deﬁned by an automaton of the speciﬁed size. Therefore, if G[k,n]
denotes the repeated game, where player 1’s possible strategies are those
deﬁned by oblivious automata of size k and player 2’s possible strategies are
those deﬁned by automata of size n, then [1] proves that the value of G[k,nk]
converges, as k goes to inﬁnity and
lognk
k goes to 0, to the value of the stage
game.
One possible interpretation of a stochastic process of actions generated
by a mixture of oblivious strategies is a stochastic process of states of nature.
The set I denotes the temporal states of nature and g(i,j) is the cost of the
decision maker (player 2 in the game-theoretic interpretation) as a function
of his/her action j and the state of nature i. Therefore, the result of [1]
demonstrates that a memory size that is a subexponential function of the
length of the (minimal) cycle of the states of nature is insuﬃcient to utilize
the fact that the states of nature follow a cyclic play.
A repeated game model that leads to oblivious strategies of a player is
the case where the player does not observe the actions of the other players.
The present paper proves that for suﬃciently large k the value of G[k,n] is
approximated by a function v of
logn
k . The function v depends on the data of
the stage game and its deﬁnition uses the entropy function. For a probability
distribution p in ∆(I) (the set of probability distributions over I) and θ ≥ 0,
we denote by Q(p,θ) the set of all probability distributions Q ∈ ∆(I × J)
with marginal QI on I coinciding with p and H(QI) + H(QJ) − H(Q) ≤ θ
(where H is the entropy function). Note that the set Q(p,θ) is closed and








Let p ∈ ∆(I). We prove that if σ is the mixed strategy of player 1 in
the repeated game G[k,n] that plays a k-periodic sequence i1,i2,... where
i1,...,ik are iid with P(i1 = i) = p(i), then for every strategy τ of player 2














t=1 g(it,jt) ≥ v(p,
logn
k ). There-
fore the value of G[k,n] is ≥ v(p,
logn
k ) for every p ∈ ∆(I), and thus ≥ v(
logn
k ).
On the other hand, we prove that in G[k,n] player 2 has a pure strategy





t=1 g(it,jt), is close to v(p(σ),
logn
k ) (explicitly, ≤ v(p(σ),
logn
k ) +
o(1) as k → ∞), where p(σ) is the empirical distribution of the actions
of player 1 when using the strategy σ. Therefore, the value of G[k,n] is
(≥ v(
logn
k ) and) ≤ v(
logn
k ) + εk where εk → 0 as k goes to inﬁnity. It follows
that the values of G[k,nk] converge to v(θ) as
lognk
k → θ ≥ 0 and k goes
to inﬁnity. Moreover, the limit is uniform over all stage games hI,J,gi with
kgk := maxi,j |g(i,j)| ≤ 1.
A ﬁnite automaton of player 2 with n states is a machine with n states of
memory. The memory state mt is changing from stage t to stage t+1 as a de-
terministic function of the input it. Following a play in stages 1 ≤ t < L the
automaton’s summary of the past play/data is captured by his present state
mL. Two characteristics of such an automaton are the deterministic and
stationary transitions. In [4] a striking diﬀerence between a time-dependent
probabilistic automaton and a time-independent probabilistic automaton1
emerges in hypothesis testing. It is therefore of interest to ask whether in-
equality (1) holds also for any strategy τ that is deﬁned by a time-dependent
probabilistic automaton. It turns out that it holds also for any strategy τ
deﬁned by a time-dependent mixed actions and mixed transitions. It follows
that the result about the limit of the values of G[k,n] remains intact when
player 1’s possible strategies are those deﬁned by oblivious automata of size
k and player 2’s possible strategies are those deﬁned by n-state automata
with time-dependent mixed actions and mixed transitions.
The duration of learning is analyzed by studying the value of the L-stage
repeated game GL[k,n], where the possible strategies of player 1 are those
deﬁned by oblivious automata of size k and player 2’s possible strategies are
those deﬁned by automata of size n, and the payoﬀ is the average of the
payoﬀs in the ﬁrst L stages of the repeated game. We prove that the value of
GLk[k,nk] is ≥ v(
lognk
k ) and ≤ v(
lognk
k ) + ε(Lk,k,nk) where ε(Lk,k,nk) → 0
as k and
Lk
k logk go to inﬁnity. It follows that the value of GLk[k,nk] converges
to v(θ) as
nk
k → θ and both k and
Lk
k logk go to inﬁnity.
1Interesting comments on this issue appear in [2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10].
62 Preliminaries
A pure strategy of player 1, respectively player 2, in the repeated game G∗
(with stage game G = hI,J,gi) is a function σ : (I × J)∗ → I, respectively
τ : (I × J)∗ → J, where (I × J)∗ is the set of all ﬁnite strings (including
the empty string ∅) of elements of I × J. A pair of pure strategies, σ of
player 1 and τ of player 2, deﬁnes a play i1,j1,i2,j2,... of the repeated
game as follows: i1 = i1(σ,τ) = σ(∅), j1 = j1(σ,τ) = τ(∅), it = it(σ,τ) =
σ(i1,j1,...,it−1,jt−1), and jt = jt(σ,τ) = τ(i1,j1,...,it−1,jt−1).
The L-stage average payoﬀ as a function of the pure strategy pair (s1,s2)
is gL(s1,s2) = 1
L
PL
t=1 g(it,jt), where it = it(s1,s2) and jt = jt(s1,s2). If
(σ,τ) is a mixed strategy pair, then gL(σ,τ) = Eµ,σgL(s1,s2). Whenever the
limit of gL(σ,τ) as L → ∞ exists, it is denoted by g(σ,τ), and termed the
average per-stage payoﬀ.
An automaton of player 2 consists of
• a set of states M
• an action function α : M → J
• a transition function β : M × I → M
• an initial state m∗ ∈ M
The size of an automaton is the number |M| of states.
An automaton A = hM,m∗,α,βi for player 2 deﬁnes a strategy τ = τA
as follows. Deﬁne the sequence of states (mt)t≥1
• m1 = m∗
• mt+1 = β(mt,it)
Note that mt is a function of i1,j1,...,it−1,jt−1. Deﬁne
τ(i1,j1,...,it−1,jt−1) = α(mt)
Analogously, one deﬁnes an automaton for player 1.
An oblivious automaton is an automaton A = hM,m∗,α,βi, where the
transition function β is independent of the action of the other player. Ex-
plicitly, an oblivious automaton of player 1 consists of a set of states M, an
action function α : M → I, a transition function β : M → M, and an initial
7state m∗ ∈ M. The size of an oblivious automaton is the number |M| of
states.
An oblivious automaton A = hM,m∗,α,βi deﬁnes a strategy σ = σA as
follows. Deﬁne the sequence of states (mt)t≥1
• m1 = m∗
• mt+1 = β(mt)
Note that mt is a function of i1,...,it−1 and thus, in particular, a function
of i1,j1,...,it−1,jt−1. Deﬁne
σ(i1,j1,...,it−1,jt−1) = α(mt)
A sequence of actions (i1,i2,...) is deﬁned by an oblivious automaton of
size |M| if and only if it enters at a stage 1 ≤ t0 ≤ |M| a cycle of length
1 ≤ t1 ≤ |M|+1−t0; namely, there are 1 ≤ t0 ≤ |M| and 1 ≤ t1 ≤ |M|+1−t0
such that for every t ≥ t0 we have (mt = mt+t1 and thus) it = it+t1. For
example, set t0 = min{t ≥ 1 | ∃t0 > t with mt0 = mt} and t1 = min{t ≥ 1 |
mt0 = mt0+t}.
The set of all automata of size n of player 2 (as well as the set of all
strategies of player 2 that are deﬁned by automata of size n) is denoted
A(n). The set of all oblivious automata of player 1 of size k (as well as the
set of all strategies of player 1 that are deﬁned by oblivious automata of size
k) is denoted by Ao(k). For a ﬁnite set A we denote by ∆(A) all probability
measures on A. [k] denotes the set {1,...,k}. dαe denotes the smallest
integer that is ≥ α.
For two probability measures P and Q on a measure space X we denote
by kP −Qk the supremum over measurable Y ⊂ X of 2(P(Y )−Q(Y )). If X
is a ﬁnite or discrete space, kP − Qk =
P
x∈X |P(x) − Q(x)|. If QI and QJ
are measures on the (ﬁnite sets or) spaces I and J respectively, then QI ⊗QJ
denotes the product measure on I × J with marginal measures QI on I and
QJ on J.
3 The results
The deterministic play induced by a pure strategy σ ∈ A(k) of player 1
and a pure strategy τ ∈ A(n) of player 2 enters a cycle (of length ≤ kn)
and therefore the average per-stage payoﬀ, g(σ,τ), is well deﬁned. A mixed
8strategy σ ∈ ∆(A(k)) of player 1 and a mixed strategy τ ∈ ∆(A(n)) induce a
random play, which is a mixture of periodic plays, and therefore the expected
average per-stage payoﬀ is well deﬁned and denoted g(σ,τ).
For p ∈ ∆(I) and θ ≥ 0 we denote by Q(p,θ) the set of all probability
measures Q on I × J such that QI = p and H(QI) + H(QJ) − H(Q) ≤ θ.
Note that for every distribution Q ∈ ∆(I × J) we have 0 ≤ H(QI) +
H(QJ) − H(Q) with equality iﬀ Q is a product distribution, and H(QI) +
H(QJ) − H(Q) ≤ min(log|I|,log|J|). The term H(QI) + H(QJ) − H(Q),
called the mutual information of i and j, is an information-theoretic quantity
that measures the dependence of i and j when Q is the distribution of (i,j).
For p ∈ ∆(I) and θ ≥ 0 we denote by vg(p,θ), or v(p,θ) for short, the




and vg(θ), or v(θ) for short, denotes the maximum of v(p,θ), where the max




Note that for every p ∈ ∆(I) and θ ≥ 0, v(p,θ) and v(θ) are functions of the





p(i)g(i,j) ≥ v(p,θ) ≥ v(p,0) − kgk
√
2θln2
Indeed (see, e.g., Cover and Thomas (1991), p. 300), for every distribution
Q ∈ ∆(I×J), H(QI)+H(QJ)−H(Q) ≥ 1
2ln2kQ−QI⊗QJk2. Therefore, the
inequality H(QI)+H(QJ)−H(Q) ≤ θ implies that kQ−QI⊗QJk ≤
√
2θln2.
Thus, EQg(i,j) ≥ EQI⊗QJg(i,j) −
√
2θln2kgk ≥ v(QI,0) − kgk
√
2θln2,
implying that v(p,θ) ≥ v(p,0) − kgk
√
2θln2.
Another property of the function v(p,θ) is its convexity in θ, which follows
from the concavity of the function Q 7→ HQ(i | j).
The ﬁrst proposition bounds from below the values of G[k,n] and GL[k,n]















and Val GL[k,n] →L→∞ Val G[k,n].
9The proof is given in Section 4.
The next proposition generalizes Proposition 1. To motivate it, we de-
scribe here the family, parameterized by p ∈ ∆(I), of oblivious strate-
gies σ(p) ∈ ∆(Ao(k)) such that minτ∈A(n) gL(σ(p),τ) ≥ v(p,
logn
k ). For
p ∈ ∆(I) the strategy σ(p) plays a k-periodic sequence i1,i2,...,ik,... such
that i1,...,ik are iid and the distribution of it is p. It follows that 1) the en-
tropy of (i1,...,ik) equals kH(p), and 2) the expected empirical distribution
of i1,...,ik equals p. Under these two conditions on the oblivious strategy
σ, a more general inequality holds: for every family T of n mixed strategies











The next proposition generalizes inequality (2) to the case when condition 1)
holds but H(i1,...,ik) ≤ kH(p). Given an oblivious strategy σ of player 1
in the repeated game and a positive integer k we denote by pk(σ) the average
empirical distribution of (i1,...,ik), namely, pk(σ)[i] = 1
k
Pk
t=1 Prσ(it = i).
Proposition 2 Let σ be an oblivious mixed strategy of player 1 such that
the per-stage entropy of the process i1,...,ik is H. Let T be a set of n mixed




gk(s,τ) dσ(s) ≥ v(p,
logn
k
+ H(p) − H)
Note that we can assume without loss of generality that the support S of
σ is ﬁnite. Thus,
R
minτ∈T gk(s,τ) dσ(s) =
P
s∈S σ(s)minτ∈T gk(s,τ). Note
that if H = H(p) (namely, i1,...,ik are iid with Pr(it = i) = p(i)), then the
term H(p) − H in the argument vanishes.
An interesting special case of Proposition 2 is when n = 1. This spe-
cial case implies a characterization both of the oblivious strategies that are
approximately optimal in long ﬁnitely repeated games and of the oblivious
strategies that are optimal in the inﬁnitely repeated game. Indeed, for n = 1,
Proposition 2 implies that for every oblivious strategy σ of player 1, every
positive integer k, and every mixed strategy τ of player 2, we have
gk(σ,τ) ≥ v(p
k(σ),H(p
k(σ)) − Hk(σ)) (3)
10where Hk(σ) is the per-stage entropy of the process i1,...,ik. It follows that
if σk is a sequence of oblivious strategies of player 1 in the k-stage repetition










(see [17, Lemma 3]). Therefore, if p ∈ ∆(I) is an optimal strategy of player
1 in the stage game G and σk is a sequence of oblivious strategies of player
1 in the k-stage repeated game (respectively, the restriction of an oblivious
strategy σ of the inﬁnitely repeated game to the ﬁrst k-stages) with2
p
k(σ
k) → p and Hk(σ
k) → H(p) (4)
then σk is approximate optimal in the k-stage repeated game (respectively,






k,τ) = Val G
On the other hand, if σk is a sequence of oblivious strategies of player 1 in the
k-stage repeated game (respectively, the restriction of an oblivious strategy
σ of the inﬁnitely repeated game to the ﬁrst k-stages) and p ∈ ∆(I) and
condition (4) does not hold, namely, limsupk→∞ kpk(σk)−pk+|H(p)−Hk| >
0, then there is a stage payoﬀ g and ε > 0 such that p is an optimal strategy
of the stage game G = hI,J,gi but σk is not ε-optimal for suﬃciently large
k (respectively, σ is not optimal in the inﬁnitely repeated game).
If p∗ is a unique optimal strategy of the stage game G, then there is
δ = δ(G) > 0 such that v(p,∗) ≤ v(p∗,0) − δkp − p∗k1. Therefore, for every
oblivious strategy σ we have
min
τ gk(σ,τ) ≤ v(p
k(σ),0) ≤ v(p




τ gk(σ,τ) ≤ v(p
∗,0) − δ
p
|Hk − H(p∗)| (6)
Therefore, if p is the unique optimal strategy of player 1 in the stage game,
then an oblivious strategy σ in the inﬁnitely repeated game is optimal if and
only if condition (4) holds.
Now we turn to the main result of the paper.
2Condition (4) states, in other words, that the relative entropy (Kullback-Leibler di-
vergence) between σk and p⊗k is o(k) as k → ∞.
11Theorem 1 Let θ ≥ 0 and (nk)k≥1 with
lognk
k → θ ≥ 0 as k → ∞. Then




g(σ,τ) →k→∞ v(θ) (7)
and









g(σ,τ) →k→∞ v(θ) (8)
and, moreover,3
∃τ ∈ A(nk) s.t. ∀σ ∈ A









k log k →∞
v(θ) (10)
The theorem has four parts, each one of independent importance. The ﬁrst
part, (7), provides the asymptotic behavior of the values of G[k,nk]. The
second part, (8), asserts that player 2 has an approximate optimal pure
strategy in the game G[k,nk]. Namely, if nk ∼ 2θk, then player 2 has a
pure strategy τ ∈ A(nk) such that for every strategy σ ∈ Ao(k) of player 1,
g(σ,τ) ≤ v(θ) + o(1). The third part asserts that moreover the approximate
optimal strategy τ ∈ A(n) can also exploit the suboptimality of σ. The fourth
part, (10), provides an upper bound for the duration of eﬀective learning.
Note that in contrast to (8), the approximate optimal strategy of player 2 in
the ﬁnitely repeated game is a mixture of automata. We do not know if the
limit in (10) also holds when the min is over pure strategies τ ∈ A(nk), nor
if the condition
Lk
k logk → ∞ is necessary.
The following lemma is used in the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 1 Let I and J be ﬁnite sets. There is a sequence εk > 0 that
converges to 0 as k → ∞ and there are subsets Sk(θ), θ ≥ 0, of Jk such that
1) θ ≤ η =⇒ Sk(θ) ⊂ Sk(η) and |Sk(θ)| ≤ 2θk, and
2) for every g : I × J → R with kgk ≤ 1 and θ ≥ 4εk, for every i =






g(it,jt) ≤ vg(e(i),θ) + εk
where e(i) is the empirical distribution of i.
3Stronger optimality properties of τ will be discussed later.
124 Proofs
4.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Let 0 < εk →k→∞ 0 with 2−2εkk = o(εk) as k → ∞ be such that k|I| ≤ (k +
1)|I×J| ≤ 2εkk/2 and |I|k exp(−2εkk/4) = o(ε
|I×J|+1
k ) and H(Q)−H(Q0) ≤ εk/8
whenever kQ − Q0k < |J|/k.
Let 0 ≤ δk be the max of vg(p,θ−4εk)−vg(p,θ) where the max is over all
g : I ×J → R with kgk ≤ 1, p ∈ ∆(I), and θ ≥ 4εk. The function (g,p,θ) 7→
vg(p,θ) is continuous, and therefore uniformly continuous on (g,p,θ) with
kgk ≤ 1 and θ ≤ log|J|. For θ ≥ log|J| we have vg(p,θ) = vg(p,log|J|).
Therefore εk → 0 implies that δk → 0 as k → ∞.
Let Xj, j = (j1,...,jk) ∈ Jk, be iid random variables that are uniformly
distributed on [0,1], and set ε = εk. First we deﬁne random subsets Sk(θ) of
Jk that depend on the values of Xj:
j = (j1,...,jk) ∈ Sk(θ) iﬀ logXj ≤ (θ − 3ε − H(e(j)))k
where e(j) is the empirical distribution of j.
The deﬁnition of Sk(θ) implies that
Pr(j ∈ Sk(θ)) ≤ 2
(θ−3ε−H(e(j)))k
and that Sk(η) ⊂ Sk(θ) whenever η < θ.
For every q ∈ Tk(J) := {e(j) : j ∈ Jk} the number of elements in
Tk(q) := {j ∈ Jk : e(j) = q} is ≤ 2H(q)k and therefore the expected number
of elements of Sk(θ)∩Tk(q) is ≤ 2(θ−3ε)k. The number of elements of Tk(J) is
≤ k|J|. Therefore, the expected number of elements of Sk(θ) is ≤ k|J|2(θ−3ε)k.
As k|J| ≤ 2εk we deduce that
E|Sk(θ)| ≤ 2
(θ−2ε)k









13Fix g : I × J → R and i = (i1,...,ik) ∈ Ik. For notational convenience
we deﬁne vg(p,x) to be equal to vg(p,0) when x < 0. What is the probability
that there is j ∈ Sk(θ − ε) with 1
k
Pk
t=1 g(it,jt) ≤ vg(e(i),θ − 4ε) +
|J|
k kgk?
The deﬁnition of vg implies that there is a distribution Q0 ∈ Q(e(i),θ−4ε)
s.t. EQ0g(i,j) ≤ vg(e(i),θ − 4ε). There is Q ∈ Tk(I × J) with QI = Q0
I and
kQ − Q0k ≤ |J|/k. Therefore, EQg(i,j) ≤ EQ0g(i,j) +
|J|
k kgk ≤ vq(e(i),θ −
4ε) +
|J|
k kgk. By the choice of ε = εk and Q0, H(QI) + H(QJ) − H(Q) ≤
H(QI) + H(Q0
J) − H(Q0) + ε/4 ≤ θ − 4ε + ε/4. Set q = QJ.
Fix θ ≥ 4ε. Let us compute the probability that there is j = (j1,...,jk) ∈
Sk(θ) such that the empirical distribution of (i1,j1),...,(ik,jk), denoted
e(i,j), equals Q. The number of elements j = (j1,...,jk) ∈ Tk(q) is
≤ 2H(q)k. The number of elements j = (j1,...,jk) ∈ Tk(q) with e(i,j) = Q





where the last inequality holds by the choice of ε = εk.
If θ − 3ε − H(q) ≥ 0 then Sk(θ) ⊃ Tk(q). Otherwise, for every ﬁxed
j with e(j) = QJ, the probability that j 6∈ Sk(θ) is the probability that
logXj > (θ − 3ε − H(QJ))k, which equals 1 − 2(θ−3ε−H(QJ))k. Therefore the
probability that j 6∈ Sk(θ) for every j = (j1,...,jk) ∈ Tk(q) with e(i,j) = Q
is
(Pr(logXj > (θ − 3ε − H(QJ))k))
|Tk(Q)|/|Tk(e(i))|







where the last inequality uses Q ∈ Q(QI,θ − 4ε + ε/4) and e(i) = QI.










is less than |I|k exp(−2εk/4) = o(ε|I×J|+1).
Let Y be an ε grid of all functions g : I × J → R with kgk ≤ 1 with
at most (3/ε)|I×J| elements. Then, the probability that there is g ∈ Y and












|I×J|+1) = o(ε) as k → ∞
Therefore, the probability that there is g with kgk ≤ 1 and i ∈ Ik such










≤ o(ε) as k → ∞
Therefore, the probability that there is g with kgk ≤ 1, i ∈ Ik, and 1 +









holds for all j ∈ Sk(θ) is
≤ o(1) as k → ∞
Deﬁne ˆ Sk(θ) = Sk([θ/ε]ε) where [∗] is the integr part of ∗. Note that
Sk(θ − ε) ⊂ ˆ Sk(θ) ⊂ Sk(θ). Therefore the sets ˆ Sk(θ) satisfy 1) of Lemma 1.
The probability that the set ˆ Sk(θ) satisﬁes condition 2) of Lemma 1 for the
sequence ˆ εk = εk +
|J|
k is close to 1. In particular, there is a realization of Xj
such that ˆ Sk(θ) satisﬁes condition 2) of Lemma 1.
4.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Fix p ∈ ∆(I). Let X1,X2,...,Xk,Xk+1,... be a k-periodic sequence of
I-valued random variables with P(X1 = i) = p(i) and X1,X2,...,Xk iid.
Therefore, for any positive integer d, Xd+1,...,Xd+k are iid. The mixed
strategy σ of player 1 is to play the action Xt ∈ I at stage t. Obviously,
σ is a mixture of strategies that are deﬁned by oblivious automata of size
k. Let τ ∈ A(n). Consider the probability distribution induced on plays
(i1,j1,...,it,jt,...) by the strategy σ and the pure strategy τ. Fix a positive

















Obviously, QI = p. Next we prove that
logn
k ≥ H(QI) + H(QJ) − H(Q)
(= HQ(i) + HQ(j) − HQ(i,j) = HQ(i) − HQ(i | j) = H(p) − HQ(i | j)).


































The ﬁrst inequality (above) follows from the concavity (with respect to the
underlying probability distribution) of the conditional entropy. The second
inequality follows from the fact that jd+t is a function of (id+1,...,id+t−1,md+1).
The following two equalities follow from the chain rule (additivity rule) of
entropies. The last inequality follows from the fact that the number of pos-
sible values of md+1, the state of the automata of player 2 at stage d + 1, is
≤ n, and thus H(md+1) ≤ logn.
Therefore,













For every r ≤ k the ﬁnite sequence X1,...,Xr is an iid sequence with Pr(Xt =







































The function p 7→ v(p,θ) is continuous in p and therefore attains its max.
Therefore there is p∗ with v(p∗,
logn
k ) = maxp∈∆(I) v(p,
logn














The convergence of the sequence of values of GL[k,n] to the value of G[k,n]
follows from the fact that the play deﬁned by strategies σ ∈ A(k) and τ ∈
A(n) enters a cycle of length ≤ kn within k stages. Therefore the L-stage
payoﬀ gL(σ,τ) is within 2kn
L kgk of the payoﬀ g(σ,τ) in the inﬁnite repeated
game.4 
4.3 Proof of Proposition 2
First assume that T is a set of n pure strategies of player 2. Let τ be a function
from {(i1,...,ik)} → T. Let Qt be the distribution of (it,jt) induced by σ




t. Repeating the argument of the proof
of Proposition 1 we have




H(QI) + H(QJ) − H(Q) ≤ H(p) − H +
logn
k
4The same argument also shows that VAL GL(k,n) →L→∞ VAL GL(k,n).
17which proves the proposition when T is a set of n pure strategies.
Let S be the support of the mixed strategy σ, T = {τ1,...,τn}, and







Let T1,...,Tn be the support of τ1,...,τn respectively, and τ := τ1⊗...⊗τn
the product probability on T1 × ... × Tn. For every ω = (t1,...,tn) ∈























+ H(p) − H)

4.4 Proof of Theorem 1
Assume that
lognk










in order to prove (7) and (8), it suﬃces to prove that
liminf
k→∞








g(σ,τ) ≤ v(θ) (12)
18Note that the function Q 7→ EQg(i,j) is continuous on ∆(I × J). For
every p ∈ ∆(I) and θ ≥ 0 the set Q(p,θ) is a closed subset of ∆(I×J) and the
map (p,θ) 7→ Q(p,θ) is continuous in the Hausdorﬀ topology on the closed
subsets of ∆(I × J). Therefore, the functions (p,θ) 7→ v(p,θ) and θ 7→ v(θ)
are continuous. Thus v(
lognk
k ) →k→∞ v(θ) and v(p,
lognk
k ) →k→∞ v(p,θ).
By Proposition 1 we have Val GL[k,nk] ≥ v(
lognk
k ) →k→∞ v(θ) and
Val G[k,nk] ≥ v(
lognk








Val G[k,nk] ≥ v(θ)
To prove (12), we construct for every suﬃciently large k a pure strategy
τk ∈ A(nk) such that if σ ∈ Ao(k) generates a sequence of actions i =
(i1,i2,...) with empirical distribution e(i) ∈ ∆(I), then
g(σ,τ
k) ≤ v(e(i),θ − ηk) + ηk
where ηk → 0 as k → ∞.
Set θk =
lognk−(2+|I×J|)logk
k . We order the elements of ∪k/2<r≤kSr(θk) so
that all elements of Sr(θk) precede the elements of Sr0 whenever r > r0.
The ﬁrst element of Sk(θk) (and thus of ∪k/2<r≤kSr(θk)) is denoted j∗. The
successor of an element j ∈ ∪k/2<r≤kSr(θk) (but the last one) is denoted j0.
For every j ∈ Sr(θk) ⊂ Jr we deﬁne a sub-automaton Aj with r|I×J|+1
states {(j,1),...,(j,r)}×{0,1,...,r−1}I×J (where the second factor stands
for all functions from I × J to {0,1,...,r − 1}.
Informally, the sub-automaton Aj, where j ∈ Sr(θk), tests whether the
sequence i deﬁned by the oblivious automaton σ ∈ Ao(k) of player 1 is
r-periodic and whether it results, when matched with the r-periodic play
deﬁned by j (repeatedly), in a payoﬀ ≤ v(e(i),θk) + εr where (εr)r is the
sequence given by Lemma 1.
The initial state of the sub-automaton Aj is (j,1,0), where 0 is the con-
stant 0 function. The action function of the sub-automaton Aj is
α(j,t,∗) = jt
To simplify the deﬁnition of the transition, we introduce the following no-
tations. For j ∈ Jr, t ∈ [r], x : I × J → {0,...,r}, and i ∈ I we
19denote by x0(j,t,x,i), or x0 for short, the function x + 1i,jt where 1i,jt is
the indicator function (1 on (i,jt) and 0 elsewhere). For a nonnegative
nonzero real-valued function x : I × J → R+ we deﬁne e(x) ∈ ∆(I × J)
by e(x)[i,j] = x(i,j)/
P
(i,j)∈I×J x(i,j), and eI(x) is the marginal of e(x) on
I, namely, the element of ∆(I) deﬁned by eI(x)[i] =
P
j∈J e(x)[i,j].





(j,t + 1,x0) if t < r
(j,1,0) if t = r and g(x0) ≤ v(eI(x0),θk) + εr
(j0,1,0) if t = r and g(x0) > v(eI(x0),θk) + εr
Recall that (j0,1,0) is the initial state of the sub-atomaton Aj0.
Informally, the automaton τ ∈ A(nk) of player 2 will ﬁrst count up to k,
by which time an oblivious automaton of player 1 will already have entered
a cyclic play. The period of this cyclic play is a positive integer 1 ≤ r ≤
k. However, an r-periodic play is also a 2r-periodic play. Therefore, this
cyclic play has a cycle of length r with k/2 < r ≤ k. The automaton τ of
player 2 will look for a periodic play with period k/2 < r ≤ k, by starting
testing k-periodic plays, and recursively, if no successful match to the r-
periodic assumption is found, moving to searching for an (r − 1)-periodic
play. The construction of the automaton is obtained by gluing together the
sub-automata Aj, where j ranges over all elements of ∪k/2<r≤kSr(θk).
The set of states of Aj is denoted Mj. Set Mr = ∪j∈Sr(θk)Mj and M = [k]∪
∪k/2<r≤kMr. Note that |M| ≤ k+
P





k/2<r≤k 2θkrr|I×J|+1 ≤ k2+|I×J|2θkk ≤ nk (where the second to last in-
equality holds for k ≥ 2).
Without loss of generality we assume that kgk ≤ 1. Property 2) of Lemma
1 guarantees that the play induced by an oblivious automaton σ ∈ A(k) and
the constructed automaton τ ∈ A(nk) of player 2 enters a cyclic play with a
payoﬀ ≤ vg(e(i),θ − ηk) + ηk, where ηk = max(θ − θk,maxk/2<r≤k εr).
Therefore, for every strategy σ ∈ Ao(k) we have
g(σ,τ) ≤ vg(e(i),θ − ηk) + ηk
Note that ηk →k→∞ 0 and recall that the function θ → v(θ) is continuous.
Therefore
g(σ,τ) ≤ vg(e(i),θ) + o(1) as k → ∞














This completes the proofs of (7) and (8). 
The proof of (10) is presented in the next section after a short discussion
regarding learning duration.
4.5 The learning duration
The ‘minimal’ learning duration is derived from the asymptotic behavior of
the values of GL(k,n). The value of GL(k,n) is ≥ v(
logn
k ) and its limit as
L → ∞ exists. This limit is ≤ v(
logn
k ) + o(1) as k → ∞.
We study the asymptotic condition on the duration L = L(k,n) such that
the value of GL(k,n) is close to v(
logn
k ).
The approximate optimal strategy τ that is constructed in Section 3 ac-






We will show that the much weaker asymptotic relation, lim
Lk
k logk → ∞,
suﬃces. The learning comprises two phases. The ﬁrst phase determines the
length of a cycle. The second phase searches for a cyclic sequence of actions
that leads to an average per-stage payoﬀ of no more than v(θ)+o(1), where
p is the empirical distribution of i1,i2,....
4.6 Learning the length of a cycle
The learning of the length of the cycle is probabilistic. If there is a cycle
of length k/2 < r ≤ k the randomly selected (deterministic) automaton of
player 2 will ﬁnd this length r of the cycle with probability close to 1. For
this part of the learning a duration  k logk suﬃces.5 Once the length r of
the cycle is discovered an additional  r stages suﬃce for guaranteeing an
average per-stage payoﬀ ≤ v(θ) + o(1).
5We do not know if it is also necessary.
21Assume that if k/2 < r ≤ k is not the length (namely, not a multiple)
of a (the) cycle of the play of player 1. Then for any s ≥ k there is a stage
s < t ≤ s + k such that it 6= it+r. Therefore, if we pick at random a subset
T of integers such that for every s < t ≤ s + k the probability that t ∈ T is
≥ δ > 0 (e.g., pick at random an integer s − δk ≤ t0 ≤ s + k, each equally
likely, and choose T = {t0 + 1,...,t0 + d2δke} for k suﬃciently large and
δ > 0 suﬃciently small), the probability that there is t ∈ T with it 6= it+r is
at least δ. Therefore, by performing suﬃciently many such checks (say K) we
can rule out each non-cyclic length r with probability close to 1 (≥ (1−δ)K).
Fix a suﬃciently small δ > 0 and set K = d2
δ lnke and ¯ q = d1/(2δ)e (the
least integer ≥ 1/(2δ)).
The random automaton will pick a list of integers t
q
j, with q = 1,..., ¯ q
and j = 1,...,K, with
2k + 4(q − 1)kK + 4(j − 1)k < t
q
j < 4(q − 1)kK + 4jk
all such lists equally likely. Note that t
q
j ≤ 4¯ qkK ≤ 4
δkK ≤ 9
δ2k logk.
The cycle learning phase is done in stages t ≤ 4kK/δ. This learning

















that |Tqj| = 3dδke and |Cq| = dδke. In the qj-th sub-phase, the automaton
records the actions of player 1 in stages t ∈ Tqj, and eliminates from the
set of possible cycles all r ∈ Cq for which a contradiction is discovered.
Thereafter, no further use of the recorded play in this sub-phase. Note that
t
¯ q




q=1Cq ⊃ {[k/2],...,k}, and the number of subsets of Cq is
2dδke.
The number of sequences of |Tqj| elements of I is |I||Tqj| = |I|3dδke, and
the number of subsets of the set Cq is 2dδke.
The set of automata states is the Cartesian product of three sets. The
ﬁrst factor is the set M1 = {1,...,[4kK/δ]}; it has [4kK/δ] elements and
it enables the automaton to count the ﬁrst [4kK/δ] stages of the repeated
game.
The second factor is the set M2 = I3dδke; it has |I|3dδke elements and it
enables the automaton to record the actions of player 1 in stages t ∈ Tqj. Note
that the natural ordering of the stages t ∈ Tqj enables us to identify ITqj with
22the factor M2 = I3dδke of the automaton; a list (it)t∈Tqj is identiﬁed with the
element (iˆ t) ∈ I3dδke where for t ∈ Tqj we set ˆ t = |{1,...,t}∩Tqj|. Note that
this identiﬁcation maps an element y ∈ M2 = I3dδke to an element ˜ y ∈ ITqj
and for r ∈ Cq and t ∈ T
−
qj we have ˜ yt = ˜ yt+r iﬀ yˆ t = yˆ t+r−(1+k−(q+1)dδke).
The third factor is the set M3 of all subsets of the set {1,...,dδke}; it
has 2dδke elements and for every integer 1 ≤ q ≤ 1/δ the unique 1-1 order-
preserving map from M3 into Cq identiﬁes M3 with Cq. This identiﬁcation
enables this factor of the automaton (together with the ‘recorded’ play in
stages Tqj) to keep track, following the play in stage tqj = t
q
j +k−(q−2)dδke
(the last stage in Tqj), of all cycle lengths r ∈ Cq that are compatible for
every j0 ≤ j with the play in stages Tqj0.
In sub-phases 1j, j = 1,...K, the automaton searches a cycle length
r ∈ C1 that is compatible with the play in each sub-phase T1j0. If such a
compatible cycle length r is found, the automaton moves to the ﬁrst state of
an automaton Mr. If r ∈ C1 is not a length of a cycle, the probability that
the cycle length r is compatible with the play in stages T1j (namely, it = it+r
for every t ∈ T
−
1j) is ≤ 1 − δ. The events “the cycle length r is compatible
with the play in stages T1j”, j = 1,...,K, are independent. Therefore the
probability that a non-cycle length r is compatible for each j = 1,...,K with
the play in T1j (namely, it = it+r for every t ∈ ∪K
j=1T
−
1j) is ≤ (1−δ)K, which
is about 1
k2. Therefore the expected number of ‘undiscovered’ non-periods
r ∈ C1 is ≤ |C1|/k2 < 2δ/k.
If all r ∈ Cq−1 are excluded as periods, we proceed to test the possible
periods r ∈ Cq in sub-phases qj , j = 1,...K.
Let us describe the transitions of the automaton (as a function of the
random integers t
q
j) in states (t,x,D) ∈ M1 × M2 × M3. The initial state is
(1,x0,C1) (where x0 is an element of I3dδke).
For t / ∈ ∪qjTqj, the transition from a state (t,x,D) is simply eﬀected by
adding 1 to the stage counter t and leaving x and D unchanged:
β((t,x,D),∗) = (t + 1,x,D) if t / ∈ ∪qjTqj
For x ∈ I3dδke, t ∈ Tqj, and i ∈ I we denote by x0(x,t,i) (or x0(t,i) or x0
for short) the element y ∈ I3dδke with ys = xs for s 6= ˆ t and ys = i for s = ˆ t.
For tqj 6= t ∈ Tqj, the transition from a state (t,x,D) is to the state
(t + 1,x0,D), which leaves the third coordinate D unchanged, adds 1 to the
stage counter t, and replaces the sequence of I elements x with the sequence
23x0 = x0(t,i):
β((t,x,D),i) = (t + 1,x
0,D) if t ∈ ∪qj(Tqj \ {tqj})
For q = 1,... ¯ q, D ⊂ Cq, and y ∈ I3dδke we denote by D0(q,D,y) the
subset of D consisting of all r ∈ D such that yˆ t = yˆ t+r−(1+k−(q+1)dδke) for
every t ∈ T
−
qj.
The transition function from a state (t,x,D) where t = tqj depends on
whether j = K or not. If j < K, the transition adds 1 to the stage counter
t, and modiﬁes the set D ⊂ Cq of non-excluded cycle lengths with its subset
D0(q,D,x0(t,i)):
β((tqj,x,D),i) = (t + 1,x
0,D
0) if j < K
where x0 = x0(t,i) and D0 = D0(q,D,x0(t,i)).
The transition function from a state (t,x,D) where t = tqj and j = K
depends on whether D0 = ∅ or not. If D0 = ∅ we move to state (t+1,x0,Cq+1),
namely,
β((tqK,x,D),i) = (t + 1,x
0,Cq+1) if D
0 = ∅
If D0 6= ∅ we move to the ﬁrst state of the sub-automaton Mr, where r is a
non-excluded cycle length Cq.
The probability of accepting a non-period r ∈ Cq as a period of the
sequence it is ≤ δ/k. Therefore the probability of approving an erroneous
cycle length k/2 < r ≤ r is ≤ d
k/2
δk eδ/k ≤ 1/k.
The number of states of the automaton used in the ﬁrst phase is |M1 ×
M2 × M3|, which for suﬃciently large k is ≤ 25δk log|I|
4.7 Eﬀective learning when cycle length is known
The second phase starts following the speciﬁcation of a cycle length k/2 <
r ≤ k. For every cycle length r we deﬁne an automaton Mr.
We partition the cycle length k/2 < r ≤ k into ` blocks of size r1,...,r`
(we may assume r1 ≤ r2 = ... = r`), and run the learning on the blocks
in tandem. We have
P`
s=1 rs = r and we denote Rs =
P
s0≤s rs0. We use
the notations of Lemma 1 and the proof of Theorem 1. Let 0 < εk → 0 as
k → ∞ and Srs(θrs) ⊂ Jrs be such that for every i ∈ Irs there is j ∈ Srs(θrs)
such that
g(i,j) ≤ vg(e(i),θrs) + εrs
24Given a list j = (j1,...,j`) with js ∈ Srs(θrs) we deﬁne a sub-automaton
Aj, which is a kind of product of the sub-automata Ajs used in the proof of
Theorem 1.
The states of the sub-automaton Aj are the triples (j,t,x) where 1 ≤ t ≤
r, and for Rs−1 < t ≤ Rs the term x is a function from I×J to {0,...,rs−1}.
We order the elements of each set Srs(θrs) and its ﬁrst element is denoted
js∗, and j∗ = (j1∗,...,j`∗). For j = (j1,...,j`) ∈ ×`
s=1Srs(θrs) and 1 ≤ s ≤ `
we denote by j0s the list j where only its s-th component js is replaced by
the successor of js in the order of Srs(θrs).
The number of states of Aj is ≤ r|I×J|+1. Therefore the number of
states of the automaton A that is composed of the sub-automata Aj is
≤ (
Q`
s=1 |Srs(θrs)|)r|I×J|+1 ≤ r|I×J|+12r maxs θrs.
The initial state of the automaton Mr is (j∗,0,0). The action function is
deﬁned by
α(j,t,x) = jt
The transition is deﬁned as follows.
β(j,t,x,i) =

      
      
(j,t + 1,x0) if Rs < t < Rs+1
(j,t + 1,0) if t = Rs < r and g(x0) ≤ v(eI(x0),θrs) + εrs
(j,1,0) if t = r and g(x0) ≤ v(eI(x0),θrs) + εrs
(j0s,t + 1,0) if t = Rs < r and g(x0) > v(eI(x0),θrs) + εrs
(j0`,1,0) if t = r and g(x0) > v(eI(x0),θrs) + εrs
After r|Srs(θrs)| stages the s-th component js of j stabilizes, and therefore
if C = maxs |Srs(θrs)|, then after rC stages the entire list j stabilizes. If
i = (i1,...,i`) is the corresponding partition of the play of player 1 in a








Fix ε > 0. There exists r0 > 0 such that for every r ≥ r0 we have εr < ε.
Recall that v(∗,∗) is uniformly continuous. Therefore there is δ > 0 such
that v(p,θ − 6δ log|I|) ≤ v(p,θ) + ε. If we select 2r0 > rs ≥ r0 and set








≤ v(θ) + 2ε
25The number of states in Mr is then ≤ r|I×J|+12r(θ−6δ log|I| and therefore
the number of states of the automaton that collates all the the sub-automata
Mr and the initial part that ‘computes’ the cycle length is ≤ 2(θ−δ/2log|I|)k,

























A ﬁnite-memory generalization of a ﬁnite-state automaton is a ﬁnite-state
automaton with time-dependent actions and transitions. A time-dependent
automaton of player 2 is a quadruple A = hM,m∗,(αt,)∞
t=1,(βt)∞
t=1i where
m∗ is the initial state, βt : M × I → M is the transition function at stage
t, and αt : M → J is the action function at stage t. Let A∗(m) denote all
time-dependent automata with |M| = m states.
A time-dependent automaton A = hM,m∗,(αt,)∞
t=1,(βt)∞
t=1i deﬁnes a
strategy τA as follows. Set m1 = m∗ and i1 = α1(m1), and deﬁne induc-
tively mt+1 = βt(mt,it) and τt(i1,j1,...,it−1,jt−1) = αt(mt). Note that τA
is a pure strategy.
The set of all time-dependent automata of size n (as well as the set of all
strategies induced by time-dependent automata of size n) is denoted A∗(n).










k = θ ≥ 0. In addition, the proof of Proposition 1












































Another ﬁnite-memory generalization of a ﬁnite-state automaton is a
ﬁnite-state automaton with time-dependent mixed actions and mixed transi-
tions. A time-dependent mixed actions and mixed transitions automaton of
player 2 is a quadruple A = hM,m∗,(αt,)∞
t=1,(βt)∞
t=1i, where βt : M×I×J →
∆(M) and αt : M → ∆(J).
A time-dependent automaton with mixed actions and mixed transitions
A = hM,m∗,(αt,)∞
t=1,(βt)∞
t=1i induces a mixed strategy τA as follows. Set
m1 = m∗. For every strategy σ of player 1 Pσ,τ(i1 = i) = α1(m1)[i], and
deﬁne inductively Pσ,τ(mt+1 = m | m1,i1,j1,...,mt,it,jt) = βt(mt,it,jt)[m]
and Pσ,τ(it = i | m1,i1,j1,...,it−1,jt−1) = αt(mt)[i]. Note that τA is a mixed
strategy.
The set of all time-dependent automata with mixed actions and mixed
transitions of size n (as well as the set of all strategies induced by time-
dependent automata with mixed actions and mixed transitions of size n) is
denoted A∗
∆(n).
After a ﬁnite history (m1,i1,j1,...,md,id,jd) of the play (and sequence of
states of the automata of player 2) the strategy of player 2 in the subgame is
one of n mixed strategies, depending on the automata state md+1. Therefore,
Proposition 2 implies that there is a strategy σ ∈ ∆(Ao(k) such that for every
time-dependent automaton A with mixed actions and mixed transitions with






























Therefore, the above result implies that if
lognk









We conclude that a mixture of oblivious automata of size k can approximately
secure the value of the stage game against any time-dependent automaton
with mixed actions and mixed transitions and of size subexponential in k.
6 Equilibrium payoﬀs
Direct and indirect results about the values and equilibrium payoﬀs of the
two-person repeated games G(k,n) and GL(k,n) appeared in [11, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. The results of the present paper enable us to derive
exact asymptotic results on the equilibrium payoﬀs of the repeated games
G[k,n] and GL[k,n], and to extend the asymptotic analysis of the values and
equilibrium payoﬀs of the repeated games G(k,n) and GL(k,n) in the case
where the size of the larger automata is an exponential function of the size
of the smaller automata.
Let G = hI,J,gi, where g = (g1,g2) : I × J → R2, be a two-person non-
zero-sum game. The set of equilibrium payoﬀs of the inﬁnitely repeated game
G[k,n] (respectively, G(k,n)) is denoted E G[k,n] (respectively E G(k,n)).
Let F denote the convex hull of the set of all vector payoﬀs g(i,j) with
(i,j) ∈ I × J. For θ ≥ 0 deﬁne v1(θ) = maxp∈∆(I) minQ∈Q(p.θ) EQg1 and
deﬁne v2(θ) = minp∈∆(I) maxQ∈Q(p,θ) EQg2.
An important ingredient in determining the equilibrium payoﬀs of the
repeated games G(k,n) and G[k,n] is the characterization of the individual
rational payoﬀs. The individual rational payoﬀ of a player equals the value of
a corresponding two-person zero-sum repeated game. Proposition 1 implies
that the individual rational payoﬀ of player i in the repeated game G[k,nk]
converges to vi(θ) as k → ∞ and
lognk
k → θ. Therefore, using the classical
arguments used in the proof of the folk theorem, we have
lim
k→∞





28By part (5) of Theorem 1 we deduce that the individual rational payoﬀ
of player i in the repeated game GLk[k,nk] converges to vi(θ) as k → ∞,
Lk
k logk → ∞, and
lognk
























follows, e.g., from simple arguments in [13].
The asymptotic behavior of the individual rational levels in the repeated
games G(k,nk) as k → ∞ and
lognk
k → θ > 0 is still unknown. [12] raises
the question whether or not the limit of the values of G(k,nk) (where G is a
zero–sum game) exists as k → ∞ and
lognk
k → θ > 0, and seeks the charac-
terization of the limit when it does exist.6 As Ao(k) ⊂ A(k), Proposition 1
provides a partial answer to this question by implying a lower bound:
liminf
k→∞




In addition, the inclusion Ao(k) ⊂ A(k) implies that the individual ratio-
nal level of player 1 (respectively, player 2) in G(k,n) is at least (respectively,
at most) his individual rational level in the game G[k,n], which by Proposi-
tion 1 is at least v1(
logn
k ) (respectively, at most v2(
logn
k + o(1))). Therefore
(13) implies that when nk ≥ k → ∞ and
lognk
k → θ we have
liminf
k→∞
EG(k,nk) ⊃ {x = (x1,x2) ∈ F : x1 ≥ v





EG(k,nk) ⊂ {x = (x1,x2) ∈ F : x1 ≥ v
1(θ) and x2 ≥ v
2(0)}
6[19] contains exact results on the corresponding questions in the repeated game model
with bounded recall.
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